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1 Introduction
Problems in which supply network formation is involved have been widely
studied in the literature from two different points of view. On one hand,
the design of efficient algorithms and the computational complexity. On the
other hand, the cost sharing of the network.
In situations where the supply can be done either directly or though
other nodes, the optimal network is a tree. Examples include water supply,
electricity, cable television, Internet, and so on.
In order to study these situations, two steps should be considered: in the
first one, agents will construct a minimal cost tree, mt for short. There exist
several algorithms for building a mt. Two of them are provided by Kruskal
(1956) and Prim (1957), respectively. Once we have constructed a mt, the
second step consists of dividing its cost between the nodes that benefit from
it. In order to do that, a rule will be used.
In this paper, we focus on the cost sharing aspect. In particular, we study
minimum cost spanning tree (mcst) situations. A group of agents, located
at different geographical points, want some particular service or good which
can only be provided by a common supplier, called the source. Agents can
be served through connections which entail some cost and they do not care
about whether they are connected directly or indirectly to the source.
There is a large literature on the cost-sharing related problem. Bird
(1976) uses Prim’s algorithm and proposes a cost allocation rule, the so-called
Bird rule. He also associates a cooperative game with each mcst problem.
Granot and Huberman (1981, 1984) study the core and the nucleolus of this
cooperative game. Feltkamp et al. (1994) use Kruskal’s algorithm in order
to define a rule, the folk rule, which has been redefined and characterized
in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a,b). The definition of the folk rule in
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b) is as the Shapley value of a particular
game associated to the problem. Other authors also use the Shapley value in
order to define rules. Kar (2002) studies the Shapley value of the cooperative
game defined by Bird (1976). Trudeau (2012) defines the cycle-complete rule
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as the Shapley value of a another particular game. Dutta and Kar (2004)
propose another different rule.
A relevant approach is to study which desirable properties are satisfied
by the different rules. Properties should help a planner to compare different
rules and to decide which rule is preferred in a particular case.
In this paper, we focus on three important classes of properties. The first
class is based on the property of core selection. This property states that
no group of agents should subsidize the other agents, paying more than the
cost of connecting themselves to the source. This is a very relevant property
in the economic literature. A typical drawback is that, in general, the core
may be empty. However, it happens to be always non-empty in the game
associated to a mcst problem. In fact, most of the rules proposed in the
literature satisfy core-selection, with the remarkable exception of the one
derived from the Shapley value of the associated game (see Kar (2002)). A
stronger version of core selection is population monotonicity, which requires
that the cost allocated to any agent will not decrease if new agents join
the society. Population monotonicity in mcst problems has been studied by
Bergantin˜os and Go´mez-Ru´a (2010), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a,
2009), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010), Lorenzo and Lorenzo-Freire (2009),
and Norde et al. (2004).
The second class is based on the property of cost monotonicity. This
property implies that the cost allocated to some node will not increase if
the cost of a link involving this node goes down, nothing else changing.
Hence, a violation of this appealing property could disincentive the agents
to reduce the costs of constructing links (see Dutta and Kar (2004)). A
stronger version of cost monotonicity requires that the cost allocated to any
agent will not increase if the cost of any link (involving this player or not) goes
down, nothing else changing. Hence, this strong version would also prelude
the agents to sabotage the construction of any link. This stronger version
of cost monotonicity in mcst problems has been studied, among others, in
Bergantin˜os and Go´mez-Ru´a (2010), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007a,
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2009), Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010), and Trudeau (2012).
There have been studied several rules that satisfy both population mono-
tonicity and cost monotonicity. In particular, the folk rule is the only of these
rules that satisfies both properties (see Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2008)).
For a characterization of rules satisfying both properties, see Bergantin˜os
and Vidal-Puga (2015).
The third class is based on the properties of split and merge-proofness.
The split-proofness property implies that one node should not have incentives
to split into two or more different nodes. The merge-proofness property
implies that two or more nodes should not have incentives to merge into a
single node. These properties are relevant in situations where the identity of
the nodes is ambiguous. For example, different departments on a University
campus can be already connected by an internal network. In case they want
to be connected to a wider supply network, should they be considered as
a single node (the campus) or as several different nodes (the departments)
connected at zero cost? Other examples are the different shops at the mall,
apartments on a building, or houses in a residential area.
Merge-proofness preludes the agents to build an inefficient network, as
next example shows:
Example 1.1 Consider three agents located respectively at nodes 1, 2 and
3. The connection costs are depicted in Figure 1 (left). Figure 1 (right)
represents the same situation after agents 2 and 3 merge, paying cost 8.
This merging is inefficient, because the three agents end up paying no less
than 8 + 28 = 36, whereas the initial problem has an optimal tree with cost
34. Assume a rule assigns Φ = (Φ1,Φ2,Φ3) in the initial problem, and
Φ′ = (Φ′1,Φ
′
2) in the second one. Then, a merge-proof rule should satisfy
Φ2 + Φ3 ≤ 8 + Φ
′
2. Inefficiency due to a previous merge of nodes 2 and 3 is
then avoided.
The properties of split and merge-proofness have been studied in many
contexts related to cost sharing problems. In a context where the agents
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Figure 1: Merging of nodes 2 and 3.
consume arbitrary quantities of possibly different goods, Sprumont (2005)
characterizes the Aumann-Shapley cost sharing method, used to distribute
the total generated cost that ensures that agents never find it profitable to
split or to merge their consumptions. O’Neill (1982), Chun (1988), De Fru-
tos (1999), Moulin (2002), Ju (2003), and Ju et al. (2007) study split and
merge-proofness in claim and bankruptcy problems. Moulin (2007, 2008) also
studies split and merge-proofness in the context of job scheduling. Merging in
exchange economies has been studied for several solution concepts by Hart
(1974), Postlewaite and Rosenthal (1974), Maschler (1976), Legros (1987)
and Rosenmu¨ller and Sudho¨lter (2004). Merging and splitting in cooper-
ative games have also been studied by Knudsen and Østerdal (2012) and
references herein.
In the context of mcst problems, the folk rule satisfies split-proofness
and, moreover, it is not difficult to derive a split-proof rule from a cost-
monotonic one. However, this is not the case with merge-proofness. Un-
der domain restrictions1, the Bird rule satisfies merge-proofness (see O¨zsoy
(2006), Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2008), and Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-
Puga (2011)). The Bird rule is, moreover, the only relevant rule defined in
the literature that satisfies it (see Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga (2011)).
1For example, assuming all the costs are different.
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However, in the most general setting, no rule satisfies merge-proofness,
as the next example shows:
Example 1.2 (O¨zsoy (2006)) Assume we have three agents located, re-
spectively, at nodes 1, 2 and 3. The connection cost between each agent and
the source is 1, and the connection cost between any pair of agents is 0. The
minimal cost is 1 and hence any rule Φ should satisfy Φ1 + Φ2 + Φ3 = 1.
Assume w.l.o.g. Φ3 ≥ max {Φ1,Φ2}. Now, if players 1 and 3 join and
appear as agent 1 alone, the planner would face the same problem as if play-
ers 2 and 3 join and appear as agent 2 alone. Then, a merge-proof rule
should assign to player 1 (say Φ′1) at least as much as to players 1 and 3
in the original problem, whereas it should assign to player 2 (say Φ′2) at
least as much as to players 2 and 3 in the original problem. This means
Φ1 + Φ3 ≤ Φ
′
1 and Φ2 + Φ3 ≤ Φ
′
2, which implies Φ1 + Φ2 + 2Φ3 ≤ Φ
′
1 + Φ
′
2.
Since Φ1 + Φ2 + Φ3 = 1 and Φ
′
1 + Φ
′
2 = 1, we deduce Φ3 ≤ 0, which is
impossible because Φ3 ≥ max {Φ1,Φ2} and Φ1 + Φ2 + Φ3 = 1.
The key issue in the previous example is that the planner has no way
to know whether agent 3 has merged with agent 1 or with agent 2. This
assumption is necessary in situations where the agents may use multiple
replicas without being detected, as for example the case of users of a web
page. However, this may not be a reasonable assumption in many other
situations. In the mcst model, one may think in the case of departments
in a campus or apartments in a building. In case the planner knows which
mergers may have taken place, it is not difficult to derive a merge-proof
rule2. On the other hand, it is not clear whether a merge-proof rule could
also satisfy core selection and cost monotonicity3.
In this paper, we model the mcst situation in such a way that the planner
knows which mergers take place. If some agents merge and present them-
selves to the planner in this way, she should solve a situation where the nodes
2For example, charging all the cost to the merging agents.
3Charging all the cost to the merging agents will clearly not satisfy core selection.
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are formed by the union of several agents. We refer to this new problem as
a (mcst) situation. A mcst situation generalizes the classical mcst problem.
Under this model, all the rules presented in the literature fail at least
one of the properties. However, we propose a new rule that satisfies all of
them, even the stronger versions. This rule is the weighted Shapley value of
a particular cooperative game4. We also propose a characterization result of
this rule with these and other properties. The other properties used in the
characterization are efficient merging, piece-wise additivity, symmetry and
positivity.
Positivity says that each node should pay at least zero. It has been used,
in the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems, by Bergantin˜os and
Vidal-Puga (2009). Piece-wise additivity is a weaker version of additivity.
Additivity and symmetry are standard properties. They are used in the
classical characterization of the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)). Different
versions of piece-wise additivity property have also been used in the con-
text of minimum cost spanning tree problems by Branzei et al. (2004), Tijs
et al. (2006), Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009), Bergantin˜os et al. (2010),
and Hougaard et al. (2010). Piece-wise additivity says that when the same
network is optimal for two different cost matrices, then the cost-sharing is
additive in the cost function.
Efficient merging, on the other hand, is related to the properties of split
and merge-proofness. Even though merge-proofness precludes agents to build
an inefficient network (as in Example 1.1), this concern is no longer relevant
when the nodes that merge are already the closest ones (as in Example 1.2).
Efficient Merging says that these nodes should not find harmful to join in
advance in these cases.
The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the model.
In Section 3 we describe some desirable properties of the rules. In Section
4In the context of pricing traffic demand in a spanning network, Moulin (2014) also
finds the weighted Shapley value of a cooperative game to satisfy the so-called routing-
proofness. This property is related to split-proofness, since it precludes the agents to get
advantage by reporting to be several different users along a path.
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4 we define a new rule, prove that it satisfies all these properties and char-
acterize it with some of them. In Section 5 we prove that this rule is the
weighted Shapley value of a particular transferable-utility game. In Section
6 we present some conclusions.
2 The model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of potential agents, n > 2, and let 0 be a
special point called the source. Let N0 = N ∪{0}. A minimum cost spanning
tree problem is determined by a cost function c : N0×N0 → R+ that assigns
a non-negative cost to each pair (i, j) ∈ N0 ×N0. We assume c(i, i) = 0 for
all i ∈ N0 and c(i, j) = c(j, i) for all i, j ∈ N0.
We assume that some agents in N want to be connected to the source,
and they are indifferent between connecting directly or through other agents.
The cost of direct connection between any pair of agents, or between any
agent and the source, is given by c. Moreover, some groups of agents can be
connected in advance, so that they behave as a single nodes. Hence, these
nodes are groups of agents.
A minimum cost spanning tree situation, or simply a situation, of a cost
function c, is a pair
(
P, cP
)
where P = {P0, P1, ..., Pm} is a subset of mutually
exclusive subsets of N0 (i.e. Pr ∩ Ps = ∅ when r 6= s) with 0 ∈ P0, and
cP : P×P → R+ is a function that assigns to each pair of (unsorted) subsets
in P the minimum cost of connecting any pair of agents of their respective
group, that is, cP (Pr, Ps) = mini∈Pr,j∈Ps c (i, j) for all Pr, Ps ∈ P. Each
Pr ∈ P is a node.
For simplicity, we write (P, c) instead of
(
P, cP
)
. Moreover, and when
there is no possible confusion, we write r, s instead of Pr, Ps, and so on.
Notice that we write 0 instead of P0, since it plays the role of the source in
a given situation.
We denote as EP = {{r, s} : r, s ∈ P, r 6= s} the set of edges in P. A
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graph g in P is a subset of EP . The cost of a graph g in (P, c) is defined as
c (g) =
∑
{r,s}∈g
cP (r, s) .
We denote as GP the set of graphs in (P, c).
A path in (P, c) is a sequence (r0, ..., rk) of different nodes in P. In
particular, we say that (r0, ..., rk) is a path between r0 and rk. We say that a
path (r0, . . . , rk) is in a graph g in P if {rl−1, rl} ∈ g for all l = 1, ..., k.
A spanning graph in P is a graph g in P such that for all r, s ∈ P, there
exists a path in
(
P, cP
)
between r and s. We denote as SGP the set of
spanning graphs in P.
A rule Φ is a function that assigns to each (P, c) a vector Φ (P, c) ∈ RP\{0}
satisfying ∑
r∈P\{0}
Φr (P, c) = min
g∈SGP
c (g) .
A spanning tree in P is a graph t in P such that for all r, s ∈ P, there
exists a unique path in P between r and s. If t is a spanning tree, we usually
write t = {(r, r0)}r∈P\{0}, where r
0 represents the first node in the unique
path in t from r to the source. We denote as STP the set of spanning trees
in (P, c).
Since c (r, s) ≥ 0 for all (r, s) ∈ EP , it is clear that we can replace SGP
with STP in the definition of rule. Such aminimal cost spanning tree is called
a minimal tree, mt for short. A minimal tree always exists, even though it is
not necessarily unique. We denote as MT (P, c), MTP for short, the set of
minimal trees in (P, c). We denote the cost associated with any mt on (P, c)
as m (P, c).
For any (P, c), a connected component is a maximal subset of P where
all the nodes can be connected at zero cost, that is, for any two nodes r, s
in the same connected component, there exists a path (r0, . . . , rk) between
r and s such that c (rl−1, rl) = 0 for all l = 1, . . . , k. Clearly, the connected
components determine a partition P of P which includes exactly one set S0
of nodes that are connected to the source at zero cost. We assume 0 ∈ S0 so
that S0 6= ∅.
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3 Properties of the rules
In this section we describe the properties that we consider a cost sharing rule
should satisfy. Most of them are well-known in the classical model of mcst
problems and we adapt them to the new context. We also propose a new
one. Now we present them in a formal way. Let Φ be a generic rule.
Core Selection: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, we have∑
r∈Q
Φr (P, c) ≤ min
t∈STQ∪{0}
c (t) .
This property says that no subset of coalitions can find it cheaper to
create their own network without the others.
Population Monotonicity: For each r, s ∈ P \ {0}, we have
Φr (P, c) ≤ Φr (P \ {s} , c) .
This property says that if the population of agents decreases, nobody is
better off. Equivalently, if the population of agents increases, nobody
is worse off.
It is straightforward to check that Population Monotonicity implies Core
Selection.
Cost Monotonicity: For each i ∈ Pr ∈ P, Φr(P, c) is non-decreasing on
c(i, j) for all j ∈ N0 \ {i}.
This property says that if a connection cost increases for coalition r
and the rest of the connection costs remain the same, then coalition r
is not better off.
The following property is a stronger version of Cost Monotonicity.
Solidarity: Φ(P, c) is non-decreasing on c(i, j) for all i, j ∈ N0.
This property says that if a connection cost increases and the rest of
connection costs remain the same, then no coalition is better off.
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It is clear that Solidarity implies Cost Monotonicity.
Positivity: Φ(P, c) only takes non-negative values.
This property says that no agent can be compensated by connecting to
the source.
Merge-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0} and g ∈ SGQ, we have∑
r∈Q
Φr (P, c) ≤ Φq ((P \ Q) ∪ {q} , c) + c (g)
where q =
⋃
r∈Q r (or Pq =
⋃
Pr∈Q
Pr).
This property says that no group of coalitions have incentives to join
a priori, assuming the cost (given by c(g)), to be treated as a single
node.
Strong Merge-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, and s ∈ (P \ Q) \ {0},
we have
Φs ((P \ Q) ∪ {q}, c) ≤ Φs (P, c)
where q =
⋃
r∈Q r (or Pq =
⋃
Pr∈Q
Pr).
This property says that if a group of coalitions (Q) join in advance in
order to be treated as a single node (q), no other coalition (s) will be
worse off in the reduced problem.
Strong Merge-Proofness implies Merge-Proofness (see Go´mez-Ru´a and
Vidal-Puga (2011)).
The following property considers the case in which one particular node
splits into several nodes, producing a new situation with additional nodes.
Split-Proofness: For each Q ⊂ P \ {0}, we have
Φq ((P \ Q) ∪ {q}, c) ≤
∑
r∈Q
Φr
(
P, c0q
)
where q =
⋃
r∈Q r (or Pq =
⋃
Pr∈Q
Pr) and c
0q is the cost function
defined by c0q(i, j) = 0 for all i, j ∈ Pq, and c
0q(i, j) = c(i, j) otherwise.
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This property says that no node (q) has incentives to split into several
nodes (Q).
Efficient Merging: If there exist two nodes r, s ∈ P\{0} such that c (r, s) =
minr′,s′∈P c (r
′, s′), then
Φr∪s (P
rs, c) + c (r, s) ≤ Φr (P, c) + Φs (P, c)
where Prs = (P \ {r, s}) ∪ {r ∪ s}.
This property says that if the closest nodes (r and s) are formed by
agents, then they should find it optimal to merge. Hence, it avoids
disincentives to construct an optimal network.
There exist some relations among these four last properties. Strong
Merge-Proofness implies Merge-Proofness (see Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga
(2011)). Next Proposition shows that Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging imply Split-Proofness.
Proposition 3.1 If a rule satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging, then it also satisfies Split-Proofness.
Proof. Let Q ⊂ P \ {0}. We need to prove, under Strong Merge-Proofness
and Efficient Merging, that Φq((P \ Q) ∪ {q}, c) ≤
∑
r∈QΦr(P, c
0q). We
proceed by induction on |Q|, the cardinality of Q. For Q = {q}, it is clear
that (P \ Q) ∪ {q} = P and, moreover, c = c0q. Hence the result. Suppose
now the result holds for |Q| < α with α > 1, and assume |Q| = α. Fix
r ∈ Q and let Q′ = Q \ {r}. Let P ′ = (P \ Q′) ∪ {q′}, where q′ = q \
r (or Pq′ = Pq \ Pr). It is clear that (P \ Q) ∪ {q} = (P
′)q
′r. Hence,
Φq ((P \ Q) ∪ {q}, c) = Φq
(
(P ′)q
′r, c
)
= Φq
(
(P ′)q
′r, c0q
)
. Under Efficient
Merging, this is less of equal than Φq′ (P
′, c0q) + Φr (P
′, c0q). Under the
induction hypothesis, Φq′ (P
′, c0q) ≤
∑
s∈Q′ Φs (P, c
0q). Under Strong Merge-
Proofness, Φr (P
′, c0q) ≤ Φr (P, c
0q), and hence the result.
For the next property, given an order σ : {1, . . . , |EP |} −→ EP , we define
Cσ =
{
x ∈ RE
P
+ : 0 ≤ xσ(1) ≤ · · · ≤ xσ(|EP |)
}
as the cone in RE
P
such that
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the ordering of the coordinates is given by σ. A real valued function F with
domain RE
P
+ is piece-wise additive if for any σ its restriction to Cσ is additive,
i.e. F (x+ y) = F (x) + F (y) for all x, y ∈ Cσ.
Piece-wise Additivity: Φ is piece-wise additive as a function with domain
R
EP
+ . Namely,
Φ(P, c + c′) = Φ(P, c) + Φ(P, c′)
for all c, c′ ∈ Cσ.
This property provides a vector structure to Φ(P, c). The main ad-
vantage of a piece-wise additive cost sharing rule is that it is entirely
determined by its value over the |EP |-coordinate vectors whose coordi-
nates take exactly two values, one of them positive and the other zero
(compare page 302 in Hougaard et al. (2010)).
For the last property, we define symmetric coalitions. Two coalitions
r, s ∈ P \{0} are symmetric in (P, c) if they have the same number of agents
and, moreover, c (r, u) = c (s, u) for all u ∈ P \ {r, s}.
Symmetry: Symmetric coalitions pay the same.
4 A monotonic and merge-proof rule
Definition of the rule
In order to define our rule, we need some additional notation. Given any
t ∈ MTP and r, s ∈ P, let c (r, s) denote the maximum cost in the (unique)
path between r and s in t. Formally, given {r0, . . . , rk} be the (unique) path
between r = r0 and s = rk in t, we define
c (r, s) = max
l=1,...,k
{c (rl−1, rl)} .
This cost function c determines the irreducible matrix first defined by Bird
(1976) in the context of minimum cost spanning tree problems. Even though
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the path depends on t, it is possible to show that c (r, s) is independent of
the chosen t (see Aarts and Driessen (1993)).
Let P =
⋃
Pr∈P
Pr. Given any i ∈ P , let P
i ∈ P such that i ∈ P i.
Given any t ∈MTP and i, j ∈ P, let c (i, j) denote the maximum cost in
the (unique) path between P i and P j in t. Formally, given {r0, ..., rk} be the
(unique) path between P i = r0 and P
j = rk in t, we define c (i, j) = c (r0, rk).
Notice that this definition implies c (i, j) = 0 when P i = P j.
Again, c (i, j) is independent of the chosen t.
Let ΠP0 denote the set of orderings of agents in P with 0 as first element.
Namely,
ΠP0 =
{
π :
{
1, . . . ,
∣∣P∣∣} −→ P : π biyective and π(1) = 0} .
Given π ∈ ΠP0 , we define Ψ
π
(P, c) ∈ RP\{0} inductively as follows:
Ψ
π
π(l) (P, c) = min
l′=1,...,l−1
c (π (l′) , π (l))
for all l = 2, . . . , |P|.
We define Ψ(P, c) as follows. Given r ∈ P \ {0},
Ψr (P, c) =
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
π∈ΠP
0
∑
j∈Pr
Ψ
π
j (P, c) .
We now derive a simplified formula for Ψ. Let rπ denote the first agent
in Pr for the order π. Then, Ψ
π
i (P, c) = 0 for all i ∈ Pr \ {r
π}. Analogously,
Ψ
π
i (P, c) = 0 for all i ∈ P0 \ {0}. Hence,
∑
j∈Pr
Ψ
π
j (P, c) = Ψ
π
rpi(P, c). Let
Ψπ(P, c) ∈ RP\{0} be defined as
Ψπr (P, c) = Ψ
π
rpi(P, c)
for all r ∈ P. From this, the definition of Ψ reduces to:
Ψ (P, c) =
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
π∈ΠP
0
Ψπ (P, c) .
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Example 4.1 Let P = {0, r, s} with P0 = {0}, Pr = {1, 2} and Ps = {3},
and let c(r, 0) = 15, c(s, 0) = 17, and c(r, s) = 3. This situation is depicted
in Figure 2.
0
r s{1, 2} {3}
{0}
15 17
3
Figure 2: Situation in which agents 1 and 2 act as a single node.
In this situation there exists a unique mt, t = {(0, r), (r, s)}. Table 4.1
presents each possible Ψπ(P, c) as well as its average, Ψ(P, c) = (11, 7).
π Ψπr Ψ
π
s
[0123] 15 3
[0132] 15 3
[0213] 15 3
[0231] 15 3
[0312] 3 15
[0321] 3 15
Average 11 7
Table 1: Ψ as an average over orders of the agents.
Main characterization
We next prove that Ψ satisfies all the relevant properties (Theorem 4.1 and
Corollary 4.2) and it is characterized by them (Theorem 4.2).
Theorem 4.1 Ψ satisfies Population Monotonicity, Solidarity, Strong Merge-
Proofness, Efficient Merging, Piece-wise Additivity, and Symmetry.
15
Proof. We check first that Ψ satisfies Population Monotonicity. Fix r, s ∈
P \ {0}. For each π ∈ ΠP0 , let π
−s be the order in P \ Ps induced by π by
removing the agents in coalition s. Moreover, P \ {s} = P \ Ps. Now, for
each ̟ ∈ Π
P\Ps
0 , we have
∣∣∣{π ∈ ΠP0 : π−s = ̟}∣∣∣ =
(∣∣P∣∣− 1)!(∣∣P∣∣− |Ps| − 1)! =
∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣∣∣∣ΠP\{s}0 ∣∣∣ .
Let αs denote this cardinal. Notice that αs does not depend on the
particular ̟. Moreover, the maximum cost of a path between r and any
other node cannot increase in we add new nodes. Hence, for each π ∈ ΠP0 ,
we have Ψπr (P, c) ≤ Ψ
π−s
r (P \ {s}, c) and thus
Ψr(P, c) ≤
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
π∈ΠP
0
Ψπ
−s
r (P \ {s}, c)
=
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
̟∈Π
P\{s}
0

 ∑
π∈ΠP
0
:π−s=̟
Ψ̟r (P \ {s}, c)


=
αc∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
̟∈Π
P\{s}
0
Ψ̟r (P \ {s}, c) = Ψr(P \ {s}, c).
We check now that Ψ satisfies Solidarity. Notice first that the maximum
cost of a path between any pair of nodes cannot decrease when we increase
the cost of some link, leaving the rest unaffected. Hence, for each π ∈ ΠP0 , Ψ
π
satisfies solidarity. Since Ψ is the average of these Ψπ, and the orders remain
unaffected when a cost increases, we deduce that Ψ also satisfies Solidarity.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness. Notice that the
maximum cost of a path between any pair of nodes cannot increase when
some other nodes merge. Hence, for each π ∈ ΠP0 , Ψ
π satisfies Strong Merge-
Proofness. Since Ψ is the average of these Ψπ, and the orders remain unaf-
fected when two or more coalitions merge, we deduce that Ψ also satisfies
Strong Merge-Proofness.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Efficient Merging. Let r, s ∈ P be one of
the closest pairs of coalitions. Let Prs = (P \ {r, s}) ∪ {r ∪ s}. Then, for
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any π ∈ ΠP0 satisfying that there exists some i ∈ Pr with π(i) < π(j) for all
j ∈ Ps, we have
Ψπr (P, c) = Ψ
π
r∪s (P
rs, c)
Ψπs (P, c) = c (r, s) .
Let Πr the subset of these orderings. Analogously, let Πs be the subset
of orders π ∈ ΠP0 satisfying that there exists some i ∈ Ps with π(i) < π(j)
for all j ∈ Pr. It is clear that Π
r ∩ Πs = ∅ and ΠP¯0 = Π
r ∪Πs. Hence,
Ψr (P, c) =
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
∑
π∈ΠP
0
Ψπr (P, c)
=
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
(∑
π∈Πr
Ψπr (P, c) +
∑
π∈Πs
Ψπr (P, c)
)
=
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
(∑
π∈Πr
Ψπr∪s (P
rs, c) +
∑
π∈Πs
c (r, s)
)
analogously
Ψs (P, c) =
1∣∣∣ΠP0 ∣∣∣
(∑
π∈Πs
Ψπr∪s (P
rs, c) +
∑
π∈Πr
c (r, s)
)
so that, taking into account that P = Prs,
Ψr (P, c) + Ψs (P, c) = Ψr∪s (P
rs, c) + c (r, s) .
The “greater or equal” part of this equality constitutes the proof of Efficient
Merging.
We check now that Ψ satisfies Piece-wise Additivity. Let c, c′ be two cost
functions on the same cone Cσ. Hence, there exists a common mt t in both
(P, c) and (P, c′) and, moreover, t is also a mt in (P, c + c′). From this, it
follows that for any π ∈ ΠP0 ,
Ψπr (P, c+ c
′) = Ψπr (P, c) + Ψ
π
r (P, c
′) .
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Since Ψ is the average of these Ψπ, we deduce that Ψ satisfies Piece-wise
Additivity.
Finally, the proof that Ψ satisfies Symmetry follows from its definition.
A relevant implication of this result is that Ψ coincides with the folk
solution in minimum cost spanning tree problems:
Proposition 4.1 Let (P, c) be such that |Pr| = 1 for all r ∈ P. Then,
Ψ(P, c) coincides with the folk rule of the minimum cost spanning tree prob-
lem
(
P , c
)
.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 1 in Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2009) that
the folk rule is the only one that satisfies Piece-wise Additivity, Symmetry
and Separability, which is a weaker property than Population Monotonicity.
From Theorem 4.1, Ψ satisfies these properties and hence it coincides with
the folk rule when |Pr| = |Ps| for all r, s ∈ P \ {0}.
From the proof of Proposition 4.1, it is clear that Ψ coincides with the
folk rule when all the nodes contain the same number of agents. The result
does not longer apply when these cardinalities are different, because in that
case the nodes cannot be symmetric.
Notice that Ψ satisfies a stronger version of Piece-wise Additivity. In
particular, Ψ is piece-wise linear as a function with domain RE
P
. This allow
us to characterize Ψ by providing its value for any c with c(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for
all i, j. We do it now. Let c01 be such a cost function.
For any (P, c01), the total cost is m(P, c01) = |P| − 1, where P is the
partition of P in connected components. For each R ∈ P, let R =
⋃
r∈R Pr
be the set of agents that form R. It is then straightforward to check that Ψ
is characterized by:
Ψr
(
P, c01
)
=


0 if r ∈ S0
|Pr|
|R|
if r ∈ R ∈ P \ {S0}
(1)
for all r ∈ P \ {0}.
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We now provide a necessary condition for Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging.
Proposition 4.2 If Φ satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient Merg-
ing, then
Φr(P, c) =
∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i} (P
∗, c∗)
for all r ∈ P, where P∗ = {{i}}i∈P and c
∗ is defined as c∗ ({i}, {j}) =
c(P i, P j) for all i, j ∈ P.
Proof. Let Φ be a rule that satisfies Strong Merge-Proofness and Efficient
Merging. We proceed by induction on |P|. For |P| = 2, we have P = {r, 0}
and c∗({i}, {j}) = 0 for all i, j ∈ Pr. Thus,
Φr(P, c) = c(r, 0) = m(P
∗, c∗) =
∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i}(P
∗, c∗).
Assume now |P| > 2 and the result holds when there are less than |P|
coalitions. The result also holds trivially when |Pr| = 1 for all r ∈ P. Hence,
assume there exists some r ∈ P with |Pr| > 1. Since c
∗({i}, {j}) = 0 for
all i, j ∈ Pr, we can apply Efficient Merging sequentially on each i ∈ Pr to
obtain ∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i}(P
∗, c∗) ≥ Φr(P
∗r, c∗) (2)
where P∗r = (P∗ \ {{i}}i∈Pr) ∪ {r}. Now,
Φr(P
∗r, c∗) = m(P∗r, c∗)−
∑
j∈P\Pr
Φ{j}(P
∗r, c∗)
≥ m(P∗r, c∗)−
∑
j∈P\Pr
Φ{j}(P
∗, c∗)
= m(P∗, c∗)−
∑
j∈P\Pr
Φ{j}(P
∗, c∗) =
∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i}(P
∗, c∗) (3)
where the second inequality comes from Strong Merge-Proofness. Combining
(2) and (3), we see that all weak inequalities are equalities, and in particular:∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i}(P
∗, c∗) = Φr(P
∗r, c∗).
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Corollary 4.1 Solidarity, Merge-Proofness, Efficient Merging and Symme-
try imply Positivity.
Proof. Let Φ be a rule satisfying these properties. By Proposition 4.2,
Φr(P, c) =
∑
i∈Pr
Φ{i} (P
∗, c∗). Under Solidarity, Φ(P∗, c∗) ≥ Φ(P∗, c0)
where c0(i, j) = 0 for all i, j. Under Symmetry, Φ(P∗, c0) = (0, . . . , 0) and
hence Φ(P, c) ≥ (0, . . . , 0).
Corollary 4.2 Ψ satisfies Core Selection, Cost Monotonicity, Merge-Proofness,
Split-Proofness, and Positivity.
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3.1, Theorem 4.1, Corollary 4.1, and the
fact that Population Monotonicity implies Core Selection, Solidarity implies
Cost Monotonicity, and Strong Merge-Proofness implies Merge-Proofness.
We now present our main result:
Theorem 4.2 Ψ is the only rule that satisfies Population Monotonicity,
Solidarity, Strong Merge-Proofness, Efficient Merging, Piece-wise Additivity,
and Symmetry.
Proof. We already know that Ψ satisfies all these properties. Let Φ be a
rule that satisfies them. Under Corollary 4.1, Φ also satisfies Positivity. We
will prove that Φ is unique for each (P, c). We proceed by induction on the
number coalitions in P. If |P| = 1, the result is trivial. Assume then that
the result is true when there are less than |P| coalitions.
Under Strong Merge-proofness and Efficient Merging, by Proposition 4.2
it is enough to prove the result assuming |Pr| = 1 for all r ∈ P.
Under Piece-wise Additivity, it is enough to prove the result assuming
that c only takes two values: 0 and some x ∈ R+. To see why, notice that
every (P, c) can be expressed as the sum of these situations, all of them in
the same cone Cσ for some σ satisfying c(σ(l)) ≤ c(σ(l
′)) iff l ≤ l′.
Under Population Monotonicity and the induction hypothesis, we can
assume that there exists a spanning graph g in P \{P0} such that c (r, s) = 0
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for all (r, s) ∈ g. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exist two groups of
coalitions Q,Q′ ⊂ P such that Q∪Q′ = P and c(r, r′) = x for all r ∈ Q and
r′ ∈ Q′. Then Population Monotonicity implies that Φr(Q, c) ≥ Φr(P, c)
for all r ∈ Q and Φr(Q
′, c) ≥ Φr(P, c) for all r ∈ Q
′. Moreover, it is
straightforward to check that m(P, c) = m(Q, c) + m(Q′, c). Hence, given
r ∈ Q (the case r ∈ Q′ is analogous),
Φr(P, c) = m(P, c)−
∑
s∈Q\{r}
Φs(P, c)−
∑
s∈Q′
Φs(P, c)
≥ m(Q, c) +m(Q′, c)−
∑
s∈Q\{r}
Φs(Q, c)−
∑
s∈Q′
Φs(Q
′, c)
= Φr(Q, c) ≥ Φr(P, c)
and so Φr(P, c) = Φr(Q, c), which is unique by induction hypothesis.
Under Positivity, it is enough to prove the result assuming that c(r, 0) = x
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. Suppose, on the contrary, that c(r, 0) = 0 for some
r ∈ P \{0}. Hence, m(P, c) = 0 because g∪{(r, 0)} is a spanning graph with
cost 0. Under Positivity, Φ(P, c) ≥ (0, . . . , 0) but since
∑
s∈P\{0}Φs(P, c) =
m(P, c) = 0, we conclude that Φ(P, c) = (0, . . . , 0).
Clearly, under these assumptions we have m(P, c) = x. Assume w.l.o.g.
P = {0, 1, . . . , p}. In particular, this implies P = {{0}, {1}, . . . , {p}}. Let
c0x be the cost function defined as c0x(r, 0) = x for all r ∈ P \ {0} and
c0x(r, s) = 0 otherwise. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, let Pr ⊂ P be the set of
nodes whose (unique) path to the source in g uses node i (including node i
itself), and let Ps =
(
P \ Pr
)
\ {0}. Both sets Pr and Ps can be connected at
zero cost. Hence, under Efficient Merging and Strong Merge-Proofness, we
have
∑
j∈Pr
Φ{j}(P, c) = Φr({0, r, s}, c) = Φr
(
{0, r, s}, c0x
)
=
∑
j∈Pr
Φ{j}
(
P, c0x
)
.
Under Symmetry, Φ{j} (P, c
0x) = x
p
for all j ∈ P. Hence,
∑
j∈Pr
Φ{j}(P, c) =
x|Pr|
p
. We can now proceed by induction on |Pr| in order to prove that
Φ(P, c) =
(
x
p
, . . . , x
p
)
. For |Pr| = 1, we have Pr = {i} and hence Φ{i} (P, c) =
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x
p
. Assume now Φ{i} (P, c) =
x
p
when |Pr| < α and suppose |Pr| = α. Then,
Φ{i} (P, c) =
∑
j∈Pr
Φ{j} (P, c)−
∑
j∈Pr\{i}
Φ{j} (P, c) =
x|Pr|
p
−
∑
j∈Pr\{i}
x
p
=
x
p
.
Notice, from the proof of Theorem 4.2, that we can replace Solidarity by
Positivity in the characterization result. In either case, the properties are
independent, as we show in the next subsection.
Independence of the properties
We present six reasonable rules that satisfy the properties used in Theorem
4.2 but one.
Without Piece-wise Additivity: Let F e be defined as
F er (P, c) =
∑
i∈Pr

c(i, 0)− ∑
S∋i:0/∈S⊂N,δS>0
(1− ei(c, S)) δS


where δS = mini∈S,j∈N0\S c(i, j)−maxi,j∈S c(i, j) determines the extra-
cost that agents in S should face after they get connected, and e is nor-
malized extra-cost function that assigns to each irreducible cost func-
tion c a vector in the simplex ∆S. See Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga
(2015) for a detailed interpretation of these terms. Let M(c, S) =
{i ∈ S : c(i, j) ≤ c(k, j) for all j, k ∈ S} be the set of agents that are
closer under c within S. When e is defined as
ei(c, S) =
{
1
|S|+1
+ 1
(|S|+1)(|M(c,S)|)
if i ∈M(c, S)
1
|S|+1
otherwise
then F e is a cost-sharing rule that satisfies all the properties but Piece-
wise Additivity. In Example 4.1, F e(P, c) = (12, 6).
The rest of the rules are piece-wise linear, and hence it is enough to define
them for any c01 with c01(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j (as in (1)).
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For any (P, c01) and r ∈ P \ {0}, let Λr ⊂ P be the set of agents that
belong to either r or to some s such that there exists a path between r and
s with zero cost. Let λr = |{s ∈ Λr : c
01(s, 0) = 0}| be the number of nodes
in Λr with zero cost to the source. It is not difficult to check that Pr ⊂ S0 if
and only if λr > 0.
Without Symmetry: Given π ∈ ΠN , we consider Ψπ. In Example 4.1, if
π(i) = i for all i ∈ N , we have Ψπ(P, c) = (15, 3).
Without Population Monotonicity: Given α ∈ (0, 1), let Φα be defined
by
Φαr
(
P, c01
)
=


0 if S0 = P
|Pr|α∑
Ps∈R\{0}
|Ps|
if R = S0 6= P
|Pr|∑
Ps∈R
|Ps|
if R 6= S0 = {0}
|Pr|∑
Ps∈R
|Ps|
− |Pr|α∑
Ps∈P\S0
|Ps|
if R 6= S0 6= {0}
for all r ∈ P \ {0}, where R ∈ P is such that Pr ∈ R. This Φ
α is a
subsidy rule where the cost of connection of the nodes that are far away
from the source in term of costs (those in P\S0) are partially subsidized
by the nodes that are closer. In Example 4.1, Φα(P, c) = (11, 7). Notice
that it coincides with Ψ(P, c). In this example, there are no nodes far
away from the source (with respect to the others). Assume now that
there exists a third node Pu = {4} with c(0, u) = c(r, u) = c(s, u) = 20
for all i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Then, Φα(P, c) =
(
11 + 10α
3
, 7 + 5α
3
, 20− 5α
)
whereas Ψ(P, c) = (11, 7, 20).
Without Solidarity: Let Φλ be defined by
Φλr
(
P, c01
)
=


|Pr|∑
s∈P:Ps⊂Λr
|Ps|
if λr = 0
|Pr|∑
s∈P:Ps⊂Λr
|Ps|−1
if λr = 1 and c
01(r, 0) = 1
|Pr|−1∑
s∈P:Ps⊂Λr
|Ps|−1
− 1 if λr = 1 and c
01(r, 0) = 0
0 if λr > 1
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for all r ∈ P\{0}. When there are coalitions that connect to the source
through a unique node, they should pay a compensation to this node.
In Example 4.1, Φλ(P, c) = (10, 8).
Without Efficient Merging: Let Φ2 be defined by
Φ2r
(
P, c01
)
=
{
0 if Pr ⊂ S0
|Pr|2∑
s∈P:Ps⊂Λr
|Ps|2
if Pr ⊂ R ∈ P \ {S0}
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. In Example 4.1, Φ2(P, c) = (12.6, 5.4).
Without Strong Merge-Proofness: Let Φ˜ be defined by
Φ˜r
(
P, c01
)
=
{
0 if Pr ⊂ S0
1
|{s∈P:Ps⊂R∈P\{S0}}|
if Pr ⊂ R ∈ P \ {S0}
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. This rule is similar to Ψ, but averaging on the
different orders of coalitions, instead of agents. It is equivalent to the
folk rule when the size of the nodes is not taken into account. In
Example 4.1, Φ˜(P, c) = (9, 9).
5 The rule as a weighted Shapley value
Another remarkable implication of the characterization result is that Ψ can
be defined as a the weighted Shapley value of an appropriate transfer utility
(TU) cost game.
For each (P, c), consider the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v+) defined as
v+(R) = m
(
R ∪ {0}, cR
)
for all R ⊂ P \ {0}, where cR(r, s) = c(r, s) for
all r, s ∈ R, and cR(r, 0) = mins∈P\R c(r, s) for all r ∈ R.
This TU cost game was first defined by Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga
(2007b). It follows an “optimistic” interpretation of the worth of a coalition
of players, since it assumes that the rest of the players are already connected
and it is possible to get to the source through them.
Example 5.1 Consider (P, c) defined in Example 4.1. The TU cost game
({r, s}, v+) is given by v+({r}) = v+({s}) = 3 and v+({r, s}) = 18.
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We now interpret Ψ as a weighted Shapley value of this TU cost game:
Proposition 5.1 For any (P, c), Ψ(P, c) is the weighted Shapley value of
the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v+) where the weights are given by ωr = |Pr| for
each r ∈ P \ {0}.
Proof. Let c01 be a cost function with c(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} for all i, j. Since the
weighted Shapley value is linear in the characteristic function, it is enough
to prove that it coincides with Ψ(P, c01) for each such c01. It is clear that
the TU cost game (P \ {0}, v+) associated with c01 is given by
v+ =
∑
R∈P\{S0}
uR
where uR is the unanimity game with carrier R, i.e. uR (S) = 1 if R ⊂ S and
uR (S) = 0 otherwise. Moreover, by definition of the weighted Shapley value
(as defined by Kalai and Samet (1987)),
Shωr (P \ {0}, uR) =
{
0 if r /∈ R
ωr∑
s∈R ωs
if r ∈ R
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. Since P is a partition of P, by additivity of Shω,
Shωr
(
P \ {0}, v+
)
=
{
0 if r /∈
⋃
R∈P\{S0}
R
ωr∑
s∈R ωs
if r ∈ R ∈ P \ {S0}
(4)
for all r ∈ P \ {0}. It is clear that r /∈
⋃
R∈P\{S0}
R iff r ∈ S0 and, by
definition, ωr = |Pr| and
∑
s∈R ωs =
∑
s∈R |Ps| =
∣∣R∣∣. Hence, the right-part
of (1) and (4) coincide, so Ψ(P, c01) = Shω (P \ {0}, v+).
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007b) proved that the folk rule coincides
with the Shapley value of the optimistic TU cost game. From this, Proposi-
tion 4.1 can also be derived from Proposition 5.1.
6 Conclusions
In the classical model of minimum cost spanning tree problems, it is assumed
that the planner is not able to distinguish who are the agents that belong
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to each node. In many situations, such as those in which the agents are
represented by geographical points, it seems reasonable that the planner can
identify how many agents may belong to the same node. This assumption is
very reasonable in the particular case of minimum cost spanning tree prob-
lems, where it is common knowledge that all the nodes want to be connected
to the source. Given this, we study three classes of properties for a rule to
satisfy. These classes are related to core selection, cost monotonicity and
split and merge-proofness, respectively. While in the classical model there is
no rule satisfying merge-proofness, here we propose one satisfying the three
classes of properties. We also provide a characterization using symmetry,
piece-wise additivity and several variations of core selection, cost monotonic-
ity and split and merge-proofness. Symmetry is an important property from
the point of view of equity. On the other hand, we do not claim that piece-
wise additivity is an essential property, but it provides a linear structure to
the solution and, as such, it allows us to pick up a single reasonable rule.
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